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The Economies 
of Employée Benefits 
Robert Swidinsky 
This paper explores some of the factors determining 
the relative magnitude of sélect wage suppléments. While 
the first section provides some insights into the nature and 
magnitude of ail wage suppléments in Canadian industries, 
subséquent sections are limited to the analysis of private 
employée benefit plans, their déterminants and of their 
determining factors. 
The system of employée compensation that opérâtes in a modem 
economy is considerably more complex than researches concerned with 
the gênerai level and structure of wages choose to admit. The inclination 
to disregard the wide variety of fringe benefits that compléments basic 
or straight-time earnings is understandable since such compensation 
créâtes a certain difficulty in the interprétation and measurement of the 
wage rate. There exists, however, considérable danger in ignoring non-
wage compensation in the économie analysis of wage movements and 
structures for not only do fringe benefits satisfy a variety of employée 
needs and accomplish several employer objectives, they hâve a unique 
impact on the allocation of économie resources, the opérations of financial 
institutions and the direction of social policy. Although the économie 
analysis of fringe benefits is in its infancy, the growing magnitude of 
benefits relative to basic earnings is a guarantee that they will command 
increasing attention. 
The limited purpose of this paper is to explore some of the factors 
determining the relative magnitude of sélect wage suppléments. While 
the first section provides some insights into the nature and magnitude of 
ail wage suppléments in Canadian 
industries, subséquent sections are 
limited to the analysis of private or 
employée benefit plans. In section II 
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the discussion centers on the déterminants of employée benefit plans and 
in section III it is limited to a statistical analysis of the determining factors. 
The Nature and Magnitude of Fringe Benefits 
Although there exists no generally acceptable rule as to what kind 
of rémunération constitutes a fringe benefit, the concept that it ought 
to involve an employer cost is universally accepted. Reid and Robertson 1 
suggest that total labour cost may be categorized into : 
(1) payments by the employer to his employées and 
(2) payments by the employer on behalf of his employées. 
The first category includes basic or straight-time pay, premium pay, 
paid absences and miscellaneous direct payments. The second includes 
payments to benefit plans and payments required by law. Broadly defined, 
fringe benefits would include ail labour costs except basic or straight-
time pay. Under a much narrower définition fringe benefits would be 
restricted to employée benefit plans. 
The difficulty in achieving a universally acceptable classification 
of the various payments arises because each item is designed to fulfill 
a spécifie function and possesses a différent set of characteristics. Overtime, 
shift and holiday premiums are payments for extraordinary work and 
reflect the wage necessary to attract a sufficient supply of labour. One 
nay view paid absence as a technique for increasing worker productivity 
iy establishing a better balance between work and leisure 2. Both catégories 
of fringe benefits resuit in current period money payments and are 
therefore indistinguishable from money wages. 
Private benefit plans are security oriented in that they provide a 
spécifie service or a cash income in lieu of wages during a contingency. 
The eligibility conditions are well defined. One must be sick to draw sick 
benefits, laid-off to draw supplementary unemployment benefits, or be 
of retirement âge and retire to draw a pension. The worker cannot 
himself détermine how that part of his compensation will be used until 
the contingency against which it is designed to protect in fact occurs. An 
1
 G. L. REID and D. J. ROBERTSON, « Introduction », Fringe Benefits., Labour 
Costs and Social Security, éd., Reid and Robertson, London, Allen and Unwin, 
1965, p. 20. 
2 See Donna ALLEN, Fringe Benefits : Wages or Social Obligation ? Ithaca, 
N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1964, Ch. 2. 
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additional distinguishing feature is that, unlike other fringe benefits, 
employée benefit plans generally hâve a private market counterpart. 
Thus they rather closely approach the concept of deferred wages. 
The relative importance of supplemental pay as a form of labour 
rémunération has been growing steadily since 1947. On the national level 
supplementary labour income increased from 213 million dollars in 1947 
to 1,818 million dollars in 1968, representing a respective increase from 
3.4 to 5.3 percent of total wages and salaries 3. If employer contributions 
to social insurance and government pension funds are included, supple-
mentary labour income represented 4.8 and 8.7 percent of total wages 
and salaries in 1947 and 1968, respectively. 
The absolute and relative costs of the fringe benefits accruing to 
production workers in manufacturing in 1968 are presented in Table I. 
The average cost of fringe benefits is estimated at 1,153 dollars, 
representing 23.4 percent of the cost of straight-time pay and 19 percent 
of the total labour costs of production. There exist, however, considérable 
différences among the two-digit industries. The cost of fringe benefits 
ranged from a low of 13.8 cents per paid hour in the knitting industry 
to a high of 95 cents in the petroleum industry. The means cost per paid 
hour was 46.9 cents and the standard déviation was 19.1 cents. By 
contrast the mean and standard déviation for average gross hourly earnings 
were 2.37 and .50 dollars, respectively. The resulting coefficients of 
variation were 40.7 percent for fringe benefits and 21.1 percent for 
gross hourly earnings. 
The above calculations suggest that total hourly labour costs contain 
a greater degree of variation because of the inclusion of fringe benefits 
than do straight-time hourly earnings. Thus fringe benefits tend to create 
an industrial labour cost structure that is substantially wider than the 
basic wage structure. For example, the hourly labour cost differential 
between the petroleum and the knitting industry was roughly 142 percent 
whereas the basic wage differential was only 98 percent. Clearly, fringe 
benefits can exert an impact on the allocation of labour, and the magnitude 
of this impact will obviously dépend on the worker's awareness of thèse 
benefits as well as the value placed on them relative to money wages. 
3
 Supplementary labour income includes empïoyer's contributions to employée 
welfare and pension funds, to workmen's compensation and industrial vacation 
funds, and to the unemployment insurance fund. See Bank of Canada, Statistical 
Summary, Ottawa, Monthly. 
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Since the classification of employée benefit plans as fringe benefits 
is unquestionable, the foregoing analysis will be restricted to thèse items 
of labour cost. Although benefit plans represent only 25.2 percent of ail 
cost items that can be loosely classified as fringe benefits, and only 
5.2 percent of gross payroll, their économie and social impact far exceeds 
that of other fringe items. The économie and social implications of 
employée pension plans alone are major considérations in terms of 
saving behavior, économie growth, and the functioning of financial 
institutions. Clearly, employée pension plans may not only effect resource 
allocation by restricting labour mobility, they may also shape the direction 
of social policy with respect to income security. 
TABLE I 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL FRINGE BENEFIT COST IN DOLLARS AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
BASIC PAY FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING, 1968 
Fringe Benefit Dollars per Percent of 
Employer Basic Pay 
Premium Pay $191 3.9% 
Overtime and holiday $140 2.9% 
Shift Work 43 0.9 
Other 8 0.1 
Paid Absence 438 8.9 
Holiday Pay 163 3.3 
Vacation Pay 257 5.2 
Sick Leave Pay 16 0.3 
Personal Leave Pay 2 — 
Miscellaneous Direct Payment 50 1.0 
Private Benefit Plans 290 5.9 
Pension Plans 135 2.7 
Life and Health Plans 148 3.0 
Other Plans 7 0.1 
Payments Required by Law 183 3.7 
Workmens Compensation 60 1.2 
Unemployment Insurance 52 1.1 
Canada/Québec Pension Plans 71 1.4 
Total $1,153 23.4% 
Source : D.B.S. and Canada Département of Labour, Labour Costs in Manufacturing, 
Ottawa, 1969. 
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The flow of funds into employée pension plans in 1968 was well 
in excess of 1.6 billion dollars4. By contrast, the total revenue of the 
Canada and Québec Pension Plans amounted to roughly one billion dollars 
and payments out of the Old Age Security Fund approached 1.5 billion 
dollars. Total assets of employée pension funds reached 12.7 billion 
dollars in 1968, with almost 50 percent of the assets being held in 
government bonds, 20 percent in equities and more than 8 percent 
in mortgages. Only an estimated 5 percent of the assets were held in 
non-Canadian securities. It is thus obvious that employée pension plans 
play a major rôle, not only in the provision of retirement income, but 
also as a source of capital for économie growth. 
The Déterminants of Employée Benefits 
The factors governing the relative growth of employée benefits may 
be generally categorized as : 
( 1 ) tax and price inducements, 
(2) collective bargaining, 
(3) human capital and production cost considérations, and 
(4) the influence of social policy. 
Thèse factors and some of their implications are discussed in the above 
order. 
TAX AND PRICE INDUCEMENTS 
The available évidence, although fragmentary, suggests that in the 
ordinary market goods that satisfy the workers' guest for income security 
hâve an income elasticity approaching unity5. Employée benefits represent 
a form of protection against the hazards of income insecurity arising out 
of illness, death, unemployment or old âge, and, thus, may generally be 
regarded as substitutes for the insurance and annuities available in the 
ordinary market. Workers hâve the option of purchasing the instruments 
of économie security in the private market or from their employers. The 
distinguishing feature is that the purchase from the employer requires 
group participation rather than individual decision-making. 
4
 The foliowing statistics on employée pension plans are obtained from D.B.S., 
Trusteed Pension Plans, Financial Statistics, Ottawa, 1968. 
5 The income elasticity of life insurance sales in Canada estimated from a 
log-log régression for the period 1958-70 has a value of .84. P. J. FELDSTEIN, « The 
Demand for Médical Care, » Report of the Commission on the Cost of Médical 
Care, Vol. I American Médical Association, 1964 also estimated the income elasticity 
of family payments for health insurance in the U.S. to be somewhat less than unity. 
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Economie theory suggests that, ail other things being equal, workers 
in gênerai would maximize their utility by receiving compensation in 
wages rather than some benefit-wage mix, unless this mix coincided with 
their préférences. Since employée benefit plans are largely inflexible 
this is unlikely to be the gênerai case. Several factors, however, combine 
to create a spécial market for employée benefit plans. First, the compulsory 
nature, automatic character and convenience afforded by an employée 
benefit program are attractive features to many employées. Capital and 
insurance markets are relatively sophisticated and workers do not, as a 
rule, possess the prerequisite knowledge for rational decision-making in 
such markets. Moreover, employée benefit plans eliminate the private 
costs involved in selecting appropriate security arrangements. An additional 
feature of paramount importance is that for certain employée benefits, 
such as group insurance, médical évidence and examinations are not 
required of the persons insured. 
Second, the money cost per unit of protection, especially life 
insurance, is considerably lower if the protection is purchased through 
employée benefits on a group basis than if it is purchased privately by 
the worker6. This is partly because employées acting as a group can 
eliminate or reduce the per unit loading to cover the relatively heavy 
expenses of commissions. The savings through group purchase provides 
an additional incentive for employées to accept rémunération in the form 
of wage suppléments rather than money wages. Third, under the Income 
Tax Act employée contributions up to a maximum of 1,500 dollars to 
registered pension plans are déductible from taxable income 7. Moreover, 
employées are not taxed on the employers' contributions on their behalf, 
and the investment income of the pension funds is also not subject to 
taxation, providing at least 90 percent of the income is from sources in 
Canada. Group life insurance plans receive slightly less favourable treat-
6
 Under the University of British Columbia group life plan, 48,608 dollars of 
life insurance for a maie faculty member aged 35 costs 78 dollars. Similar coverage 
obtained privately would cost an estimated 155 dollars. 
7 While there are no formai régulations governing the registration of pension 
plans, the major requirements are that ; 1 ) cash withdrawal at retirement is not 
generally permitted, 2) some funding arrangements must be adopted, 3) the 
employer must be a contributor, 4) the plan contain a well defined formula for 
pension payments, and 5) the pension funds must not be invested in the employer's 
notes or bonds and investment in the employer's shares must not exceed 10 percent 
of the fund. For a detailed account of the tax treatment of employée benefits see 
William M. MERCER and Laurence E. COWARD, Pension and Welfare Plans', 3rd éd., 
Don Mills, Ont., CCH Canadian Limited, 1967. 
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ment in that only the employer's contribution is not added to the employee's 
income for tax purposes. Sick pay plans and supplementary unemployment 
benefit plans receive similar tax treatment. 
Thèse factors, but especially the tax préférence under a progressive 
tax structure, hâve created a spécial market for annuities and insurance 
to which individuals hâve access only as employées. In effect, the savings 
through favourable price and tax treatment create effective levels of 
compensation above those that would hâve existed in the absence of 
employée benefits. Utility maximization implies a shift from the ordinary 
market for insurance and annuities to the spécial market of employée 
benefits. Moreover, assuming that they are normal goods, the décline in 
the effective relative priées of insurance related commodities available 
as employée benefits leads to a substitution of thèse commodities for ail 
other goods and enhances their elasticity with respect to gross earnings 8. 
Under a progressive tax structure the effective price of goods 
purchased through employée benefits varies inversely with earnings, leading 
one to expect an even higher earnings elasticity for employée benefits. 
The tax incentive for employée benefits such has pensions is, however, 
rendered less effective under restrictive vesting provisions. Where turnover 
is rapid and vesting provisions restrictive, employées in gênerai stand 
to gain little from the employers' contribution on their behalf. Assuming 
that employée benefits are deferred wages, the tax incentive tends to 
encourage a system of compensation which contains a high probability 
of loss to employées. This suggests that the impact of tax concessions 
in encouraging employée benefits ought to vary positively with gross wages 
and negatively with turnover or séparation rates. That is, the highest 
demand for employée benefits, particularly pensions, will occur in industries 
characterized by high wages and low turnover. 
The intent of the tax relief for employée benefits is to encourage 
private provisions for économie security. Such concessions can be inter-
8 Let Y represent an employee's gross income or the employer's labour 
cost, t the proportional tax rate, A and B securiry-related and ail other goods, 
respectively, and p and p their respective priées. If employée benefits do not 
a b 
receive favourable tax and price treatment the worker faces the budget constraint 
Y = (p A + p B)/l—t. Under the existing tax and price structure the budget 
a b 
constraint becomes Y = (p'A + p B — t p'A)/l—t where p' < p . Assuming a 
a b a a a 
utility function, U = AB, the elasticities of security-related goods with respect to 
gross income are Y (1—t)/2p A and Y / 2 p ' A ; respectively. 
a a 
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preted as a subsidy from the taxpayers to a sélect group of employées9. 
It may be argued, however, that in the absence of spécifie incentives 
the state would be forced to institute public provisions financed out of 
gênerai revenue, thus creating a greater gênerai tax burden. While this 
argument may be valid, the substitution of public for private schemes 
may trigger an income redistribution that is more favourable to those 
taxpayers not represented in private schemes. 
COLLECTIVE BABGAINING 
A salient feature of employée benefits is that they cannot be 
negotiated independently by individual employées. The worker's aspirations 
to greater security can be realized only if unions and/or employers become 
aware and concerned with thèse aspirations. Historically, unions had been 
indiffèrent or even hostile to the concept of employée benefits for several 
reasons. First, unions viewed employée benefits as an instrument by which 
employers sought to win workers' allegiance, and several unions even 
established union pension plans partly to counter this force. Second, 
économie security was viewed as a state responsibility and unions 
considerd the establishment of employée benefits as undermining their 
demands for public action 10. Whatever the reason, union attitudes began 
to shift in the late 1940's and 1950's with the resuit that employée 
benefits become an important issue at the bargaining table 11. 
The current opinion, even among employers, is that unions play 
the dominant rôle in determining employée benefits. In his 1964 survey 
of employée benefit structures in U.S. manufacturing, Greene found that 
58.6 percent of ail employers felt that unions set the pace in employée 
benefits12. The survey also indicated that union shop stewards, and 
presumably union leadership, viewed employée benefits more favourably 
than the gênerai membership. Given the bargaining structure, this may 
9 At a marginal tax rate of 25 percent the estimated 1968 tax concession on 
industrial pension contributions amounts to 254 million dollars. This estimate 
excludes tax relief on investment income, which in 1968 amounted to 468 million 
dollars for trusteed pension funds alone. The subsidy is somewhat diminished by 
the fact that pensions earned are subject to tax. 
!0 H. A. LOGAN, Trade Unions in Canada, Toronto, McMillan, 1948. See pp. 
116-17, 14-41, 593 and especially Ch. XXII. 
11
 Francis M. WISTERT, Fringe Benefits, New York, Reinhold Publishing Cor-
poration, 1959, estimated that employée benefit issues were responsible for 26.4 
percent of strike idleness in the U.S. in 1949. Wistert, moreover, claims that the 
pressure for benefits, largely from paternalistic international unions, cannot be 
in the best interest of the workers. See pp. 5-6. 
12
 Mark R. GREENE, The Rôle of Employée Benefit Structures in Manufacturing 
Industry, Eugène, University of Oregon, 1964, p. 41. 
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imply a higher benefit-wage ratio in unionized firms than that reflected 
in the distribution of employee's préférences. Since union members are 
generally asked to approve the entire agreement rather than its component 
parts, they can express their views on the benefit-wage distribution 
negotiated by their leadership only indirectly 13. 
Moreover, even if unions cannot take crédit for initiating employée 
benefits in many instances, they hâve nonetheless been instrumental in 
forcing changes in existing benefits 14. One would thus expect that unionism 
exerts a positive influence on the magnitude of employée benefits. This 
influence may be difficult to detect statiscally, however, since benefits 
first gained by unionized employées are very likely passed on to non-
union groups. 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND PRODUCTION COST CONSIDERATIONS 
Collective bargaining may be viewed as a two tier process involving 
both the level and the distribution of labour rémunération. Employers 
are not indiffèrent to either phase. Since labour costs are incurred with 
the spécifie intention that there be some return to the firm, employers will 
favour that distribution of labour costs between wages and benefits which 
best achieves certain économie, social and political objectives 15. Certain 
items in the wage bill assume an attractive rôle ; some are mainly retentive 
in purpose ; and still other items hâve a bearing on labour morale and 
productivity. 
Employée benefits presumably improve worker's productivity by 
inducing a feeling of security and by allowing older and less efficient 
workers to retire 16. In this sensé, employée benefits are a form of private 
13
 The membership has been known to reject contracts negotiated because of 
the inclusion or exclusion of benefits. See Richard A. LESTER « Benefits as a 
Preferred Form of Compensation ». Southern Economie Journal, Chapel Hill, April, 
1967, p. 489, f. 5. 
14
 See Gordon MILLING, «Labour's Interest in Pension Planning», Pensions 
in Canada, éd., Laurence E. COWARD, Don Mills, Ont., CCH Canadian Limited, 
1964. The changes hâve been primarily in vesting provisions, early retirement, 
funding and contributions. The unions hâve also assumed a certain responsibility 
for administration. 
!5 A list of possible employer objectives may include removal from the payroll 
of older workers, création of favourable employée attitudes, réduction of pressure 
for government intervention and maintenance of effective relations with unions. 
!6 In the survey conducted by Greene, 27.2 percent of the employers inter-
viewed suggest improved employée morale as an objective and 21.6 percent 
suggested increased efficiency due to an increased feeling of security. See GREENE, 
The Rôle of Employée Benejit Structures in Manufacturing lndustry, pp. 42-5. 
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investment by employers in their work force. It is unlikely however that 
the returns from such an investment are sufficient to offset its costs. 
Indeed, the social benefits derived from employée benefits may far exceed 
the private benefits. 
Although employée benefits may also play an attractive rôle, it is 
their retentive rôle that has been most emphasized. Non-vesting pensions, 
in particular, hâve the économie function of restraining employées from 
quitting. If a worker quits, the non-vested portion of his pension is returned 
to the firm, thus providing an insurance against the capital loss incurred 
by that firm in hiring and training that worker. Since the annual investment 
by firms in on-the-job training of employées has risen dramatically in 
récent yearsn , it is conceivable that employers would désire greater 
insurance against potential capital losses. If employée benefits prove more 
effective than higher wages in reducing turnover rates, the secular increase 
in benefits relative to earnings may be attributable, in part, to rising 
potential turnover costs. 
There has been a scarcity of empirical studies which in fact de-
monstrate a relation between employée benefits and labour mobility. 
The factors affecting turnover rates are complex and employée benefits 
alone are unlikely to alter the existing pattern. Thus an ambivalent 
employer attitude towards benefits is conceivable. A high benefit-wage 
ratio may prove ineffective in retaining employées while simultaneously 
presenting a severe obstacle in the recruitment of new workers. If workers 
value benefits at less than cost the equilibrium total wage rate facing 
the firm will vary directly with the benefit to money wage ratio. 
Employée benefits and money wages are équivalent with respect 
to regular time production costs but they are not équivalent if production 
involves overtime, shift or holiday work. If premium pay production is 
sizeable and unavoidable because of the nature of production, capital 
constraints, or unforeseen events such as absenteeism, breakdowns or 
temporary increases in demand, the profit maximizing employer would 
favour a higher benefit-money wage ratio since the premium is paid only 
on the wage component. One would thus expect a positive association 
between the benefit-wage ratio and the extent of production activity 
commanding premium pay. 
17
 J. MINCER, « On-the-Job Training : Costs, Returns and Implications >, 
Journal of Political Economy, Chicago, October, 1962 Supplément, estimated that 
aggregate annual investments in on-the-job training in the U.S. more than doublée 
between 1939 and 1958. 
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The inhérent danger is that as fringe benefits and turnover costs 
increase relative to straight-time money wages, thèse costs commence to 
pose a barrier to expanding employment. While Garbarino has argued 
that this is unlikely to be true in the U.S. at présent, a more complète 
study by MacDonald renders the fringe barrier hypothesis highly 
plausible18. Moreover, in an analysis of labour costs in Europe and 
Britain, Reid 19 finds strong évidence that the system of social charges 
in Italy has encouraged excessive use of overtime and the employment 
of highter skilled labour where lower skills would hâve sufficed. The 
incentive to employ overtime rather than expand employment in the 
Italian case was created mainly by a system of fringe benefits which were 
not proportional to wages but simply depended on the employment of 
a worker. A somewhat similar impact may resuit if the earnings on which 
benefits are paid are subject to a ceiling, as in the case of workmen's 
compensation and the Canada and Québec Pension Plans. 
THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL P0LICY 
When formai provisions for économie security are largely absent, 
the public and private sectors are virtually unconstrained in their efforts 
to meet the challenge of insecurity. As each sector expands in scope, 
there may arise a conflict between private and public plans. More precisely, 
an emerging public program of économie security may render the system 
of employée benefit plans redundant. 
The objective of any system of income maintenance should be to 
ensure that those who need income protection are provided with it in 
the most efficient way. If the criteria used to assess the relative merits 
of différent methods of providing security is économie efficiency and 
adequacy, the superiority of state schemes over private arrangements is 
fairly obvious. Only a state scheme is capable of comprehensive coverage, 
18 Overtime would be profitable if (F+T) /H>1/2W where F represents fringe 
benefits, T turnover costs, H the number of hours of additional employment 
required and W the straight time wage rate for existing and newly hired workers. 
The premium on overtime is 1/2W and the output from derived from an hour of 
overtime is assumed equal to the output from an équivalent expension in employ-
ment. The fringe barrier theory asserts that since (F-fT) /H has been increasing 
more rapidly than W it is profitable to use an increasing amount of overtime. See 
Joseph W. GARBARINO, « Fringe Benefists and Overtime as Barriers to Expanding 
Employment», Industry and Labour Relations Review, Ithaca, April, 1964, and 
Robert M. MACDONALD, « The Fringe Barrier Hypothesis and Overtime Behavior : 
Comment, » Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Ithaca, July, 1966. 
19
 G. L. REID, « Supplementary Labour Cost in Europe and Britain », Fringe 
Benefits, Labour Costs and Social Security, éd., Read and Robertson, pp. 112-117. 
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adaptability to différent risks and circumstances and the provision of 
adéquate benefits in a systematic manner. Private benefit schemes generally 
operate in a manner typical of private insurance and thus inherit its 
inflexible nature. In other words, public schemes hâve a social aspect 
which is largely absent in private benefit plans. 
Even though private benefit plans are clearly inadéquate in meeting 
the income security needs of society, the rôle played by public schemes 
will dépend largely on the prevailing climate of political opinion20. If 
society believes that the state's function in providing security should be 
minor in a free enterprise System, private benefit plans will assume 
considerably more importance. As social and political attitudes change, 
whatever the reason, the encroachment of state provisions pre-empts the 
functions of employée benefits. Although this does not necessarily remove 
the cost burden from the employer, it does remove économie security 
as an issue in collective bargaining. 
A state scheme may be exhaustive, leaving no rôle for private 
benefits, or it may allow an intégration of the two Systems. In either case 
employers and employées must re-assess the relevance of employée benefit 
plans. Under the Unemployment Insurance Act and Workmen;'s Com-
pensation there is little scope for private arrangements, even if they were 
permissible. Provincial Hospital Insurance plans and the Fédéral Médical 
Insurance plan hâve replaced the arrangements made through employée 
benefits. Since OAS, CPP and QPP do not provide retirement benefits 
considered adéquate there is scope for intégration. The existence of public 
arrangements does, however, reduce the pressure for private plans as 
witnessed by the sharp increase in cash withdrawals following the 
introduction of the Canada and Québec Pension Plans21. 
Some Statistical Evidence 
Theoretical considérations suggest that the cost of employée benefits 
relative to money wages should vary directly with the level of money 
wages, degree of unionization, turnover costs and the extent of production 
20
 See G. L. REID and D. J. ROBERTSON, Fringe Benefits, Labour Costs and 
Social Security, pp. 324-327. See also Robert TILONE, «The Impact of Social 
Insurance on the Development of Private Benefit Plans, » The Princeton Sympo-
sium on The American System of Social Insurance, éd., W. G. Bowen et. al. New 
York, McGraw-Hill, 1968. 
21
 Cash withdrawals from Trusteed Pension Funds averaged 41.2 million 
dollars during the period 1960-64. They increased to an average of 88.5 million 
dollars during the period 1965-68, reaching a peak of 106 million dollars in 1966. 
See D.B.S., Trusteed Pension Plans, Financial Statistics, p. 12, Table B. 
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activity commanding premium pay and inversely with turnover rates and 
the adequacy and scope of state income maintenance schemes. The 
Department of Labour has published annually since 1967 information 
on fringe benefits for 20 two-digit manufacturing industries22. The 
average expenditure as a percentage of gross payroll in each industry is 
available for pension plans, total life and health insurance plans and total 
benefit plans. The total includes, in addition to pensions and life and 
health insurance, supplementary unemployment benefits, severance or 
technological lay-off plans and savings and thrift plans. This data can be 
used for cross-sectional tests of the various hypothèses regarding employée 
benefit plans. 
Money wages are represented by average gross hourly earnings by 
industry, the degree of unionization is estimated as the percentage of 
production workers organized and the turnover rate is measured by the 
séparation rate for the first six months of 1966. The extent of production 
activity commanding premium pay is approximated by the percentage 
of employées by industry for whom some expenditure for overtime, shift 
work, etc., was made. This measure ignores the fact that the expenditure 
for premium work ranged from less than 1 percent to more than 10 
percent of gross payroll. 
The impact of social policy cannot be revealed in crosssectional 
analysis and adéquate time séries data is not available. The estimation 
of turnover costs présents obvious problems. Robert Rice 23 has attempted 
to capture such costs by constructing a « richness of skill mix » variable 
and by utilizing séparation rates. The reasoning for the latter measure is 
that, according to Becker, séparation rates and spécifie training are 
negatively correlated and such training is undoubtedly the chief élément 
in turnover costs. On the other hand, Walter Oi24 argues that turnover 
costs vary positively with earnings and, further, that the ratio of such 
costs to earnings increases with earnings. Since earnings and séparation 
rates hâve already been included to reflect other influences, and since 
any measure of skill mix would be highly correlated with earnings, there 
appears no need for an additional proxy variable for turnover costs, 
even if one can be found. This will, however, tend to complicate the 
interprétation of any empirical results that are obtained. 
22
 D.B.S. and Canada Department of Labour, Labour Costs in Manufacturing, 
Ottawa, Occasional, 1967 and 1968. 
23
 Robert G. RICE, « Skill, Earnings, and the Growth of Wage Suppléments », 
American Economie Review, Evanston, May, 1966. 
24
 Walter Y. Oi, «Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor», Journal of Political Eco-
nomy, Chicago, December, 1962. 
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The nature of the problem suggests that régression analysis should 
be employed to sort out the independent influences of the explanatory 
variables and to ascertain their aggregate explanatory powers. However, 
the estimâtes of the coefficients would be complicated by the strong 
interdependence of the explanatory variables, and, while there exist tech-
niques that would reduce this difficulty, the nature of the data does not 
warrant their use. The statistical analysis is thus restricted to gross 
corrélations. 
The computed corrélation coefficients are generally consistent with 
the hypothesized relationships. As Table II shows, ail employée benefits 
as percentages of gross payroll vary positively with earnings, unionization 
and the extent of premium pay activity and negatively with turnover. 
Earnings are most strongly associated with the ratio of pension plan 
costs to gross payroll. The elasticities of employer expenditures on 
pension plans, life and health plans and total benefit plans with respect 
to earnings estimated from a simple log-log régression are 3.53, 1.85 and 
2.40, respectively. While their magnitudes are surprisingly large, the 
elasticities are consistent with the expectation that they exceed unity. 
The degree of unionization is more strongly associated with life and 
health plans and with total benefit plans than with pension plans, but 
the distinction is minor. The weak corrélation between turnover rates 
and employée benefits is surprising although the direction of the corrélation 
is consistent with theory. One would expect a lower corrélation for life 
and health plans than for pension plans since the former does not involve 
the possibility of a loss of deferred wages and does generally provide 
benefits irrespective of the permanency of employment. 
TABLE II 
ESTIMÂTES OF THE SIMPLE CORRÉLATIONS BETWEEN SÉLECT EMPLOYÉE BENEFITS 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS PAYROLL IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
IN 1 9 6 7 AND SELECT VARIABLES 
Union- Turnover Premium Pay 
Earnings ization Rate Activity 
Pension Plans .732* .641* - . 5 5 4 * .749* 
Life and Health Plans .537** .682* - . 2 5 9 .709* 
Total Benefit Plans .697* .692* - . 4 6 5 * * .769* 
* Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
The strong corrélation between the percentage of employées engaged 
in work commanding premium pay and employée benefit plans is consistent 
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with the argument that employée benefits are an employer technique for 
minimizing the labour costs of production. But the corrélations are also 
consistent with the argument that higher fringe benefits hâve forced 
employers to resort to overtime. On the other hand, it may merely reflect 
the ability of unions to force employers to schedule overtime equitably 
and to provide a high level of employée benefits. 
If the turnover rate serves as a proxy for turnover costs than such 
costs exert little influence on employée benefits. The notion that turnover 
costs and earnings are highly correlated is however more plausible. This 
would certainly be consistent with the observation that, not only are 
pensions more highly correlated with earnings than are insurance plans, 
but that the earnings elasticity of pensions is also considerably greater. 
Information available on the prevalence of pension plans in 53 
three-digit manufacturing industries in 1967 provides an opportunity for 
further testing of certain hypothèses 25. The corrélation between the per-
centage of employées covered by a pension plan and hourly earnings was 
.745, whereas the corrélation between pensions and the percentage of 
employées covered by collective bargaining agreements was only .556 26. 
It thus appears that earnings, or whatever they represent, hâve considerably 
more influence on pension plans than do unions. On the other hand it 
may reflect a reluctance on the part of unions to pressure low wage 
employers into providing pensions in lieu of much désired higher earnings. 
Conslusions 
The analysis contained in this paper supports the conclusion that 
barring major changes in social policy, employée benefits will command 
a progressively expanding proportion of the increases in worker com-
pensation. This tendency is ensured by the factors that complément 
workers' préférences for increased security. One cannot predict, however, 
shifts in social policy which would disrupt the wage-benefit mix that is 
prévalent in Canadian industries. 
25 Canada Department of Labour, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 
Ottawa, 1967. 
26 A multiple linear régression of the percentage of employées covered by a 
pension plan (P) on hourly earnings (W) and the percentage of employées covered 
by collective bargaining agreements (U) yields the following équation (t = values 
in parenthèses). 
P = -27 .5 + 0.314W + 0.298 U 
(2.44) (5.98) (2.28) R2 = .597 
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L'IMPACT ÉCONOMIQUE DES AVANTAGES SOCIAUX 
Le poste des coûts de la main-d'oeuvre communément appelés avantages 
sociaux représente une part importante du coût global de la main-d'oeuvre dans 
les frais de production. Dans l'industrie manufacturière, en 1968, le coût des 
avantages accessoires s'établissait à $1,153.00 par employé ou à 23.4 du salaire 
de base. De plus, le coût de ces compléments sociaux a tendance à s'accroître par 
rapport au coût total de la main-d'oeuvre. 
On estime, par ailleurs, que les plans de pension privés ne représentent que 
25.2 pour cent de l'ensemble des coûts des compléments sociaux, mais l'impact 
social et économique de ces plans est autrement plus fort que celui des autres 
avantages sociaux. Par exemple, les sommes que les caisses de retraite ont drainées 
en 1968 dépassent 1.6 milliard et leur actif total s'élevait la même année à 12.7 
milliards. Celles-ci exercent surtout une influence sur les habitudes d'épargne, la 
croissance économique, la mobilité de la main-d'oeuvre et le fonctionnement des 
institutions financières. En outre, dans la mesure où les plans de pension, tout 
comme les autres avantages d'appoint, atteignent les objectifs recherchés, ils ten-
dent à orienter la politique sociale en matière de sécurité économique. 
Cet article traite des facteurs qui servent à déterminer le rapport entre les 
compléments sociaux et les salaires en espèces dans le coût global de la main-
d'oeuvre. D'une façon générale, si les biens octroyés aux employés sous cette forme 
étaient disponibles sur les marchés à prix identique en tant que partie intégrante 
de la rémunération du travail en espèces, les travailleurs seraient satisfaits quand 
même, car il y aurait ainsi compensation. Ils toucheraient leur pleine rémunération 
en espèces au lieu de recevoir une espèce de mélange de salaire et d'avantages 
sociaux. Toutefois, par ce moyen, le prix de certains de ces compléments, en parti-
culier l'assurance sur la vie, est abaissé par l'achat de polices de groupe. De plus, 
en vertu de la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu, les sommes versées aux caisses de 
retraite ne sont pas imposables comme les salaires en espèces. Aussi, l'épargne 
résultant du prix d'achat plus intéressant de l'assurance de groupe et de la soustrac-
tion des montants ainsi versés du revenu imposable est-elle un avantage réel qui 
n'existerait pas pour le salarié en l'absence de ces compléments sociaux. Sous un 
régime d'impôt progressif, plus les revenus sont élevés, plus la somme épargnée en 
ce cas est élevée. Toutefois, à cause des clauses restrictives dont sont assortis les 
régimes de caisses de retraite, il se peut que les travailleurs encourent des pertes 
considérables si le taux de roulement du personnel est fort. En effet, les travail-
leurs qui, pour une raison ou l'autre, laissent leur emploi, perdent la part de 
la contribution versée par l'employeur. En conséquence, plus les salaires sont 
élevés, plus il y a avantage à bénéficier de compléments sociaux nombreux ; plus 
la rotation du personnel est forte, moindre est cet avantage. 
À l'origine, les syndicats s'opposaient aux compléments sociaux, mais ils 
en sont venus, à une époque plus rapprochée, à se faire les protagonistes de cette 
forme de compensation. Les données disponibles tendent à démontrer que les 
chefs syndicaux favorisent plus les compléments sociaux que les travailleurs eux-
mêmes. Aussi, peut-on s'attendre à ce que l'augmentation du taux de syndicalisation 
favorise l'augmentation des compléments sociaux, qui constitueront dans l'avenir 
une part sans cesse accrue de la rémunération globale du travail. 
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Les employeurs peuvent envisager les compléments sociaux comme une espèce 
d'investissement dans la main-d'oeuvre. Quelques-uns de ces avantages, comme les 
caisses de retraite non contributoires, visent à la conservation de la main-d'oeuvre. 
Le travailleur qui bénéficie d'un tel avantage hésite à quitter son emploi. Si les 
avantages sociaux qu'ils accordent à leurs employés s'avèrent plus efficaces que 
les taux de salaires élevés pour réduire le roulement de la main-d'oeuvre et, par 
conséquent, le coût du roulement, les employeurs préféreront un mode de rému-
nération qui fait une plus large part aux avantages sociaux. De plus, si les exigences 
de la production requièrent beaucoup de surtemps, les employeurs désireux d'ac-
croître leur marge de profit favoriseront l'accroissement des compléments sociaux 
car la prime qu'il leur faut ajouter dans la rémunération des heures supplémen-
taires se calcule à partir du taux de salaire de base. Aussi, dans ce cas, le rapport 
avantages sociaux-taux de salaire est directement proportionnel aux coûts de roule-
ment de personnel et à l'importance des heures supplémentaires dans le travail 
de production. 
Enfin, parce que les mesures de sécurité sociales étatiques relatives à la sécurité 
du revenu se substituent aux régimes d'avantages sociaux privés, ceux-ci peuvent 
dans l'avenir tendre à changer de nature et à représenter une moindre part de la 
rémunération du travail. Des mesures, tels les régimes des rentes des gouvernements 
du Canada et du Québec, l'assurance-hospitalisation et l'assurance-maladie, rendent 
les avantages sociaux moins nécessaires, même s'ils ne les remplacent pas entière-
ment. 
Compte tenu de la disponibilité de statistiques pertinentes, la vérification de 
l'hypothèse précédente ne peut être que rudimentaire. Il est possible de voir pour 
l'année 1967 la relation qui existe, d'une part, entre les avantages sociaux (plans 
de pensions, assurance sur la vie, assurance-maladie et plans intégrés) et, d'autre 
part, des facteurs comme les revenus, le degré de syndîcalisation, le roulement de 
la main-d'oeuvre et la prime de surtemps pour une vingtaine d'industries manu-
facturières. Tel qu'il fallait s'y attendre, il y a corrélation entre les deux séries 
de facteurs. Les revenus, le degré de syndicalisation et les primes de rendement 
exercent une influence positive sur les avantages sociaux, tandis que le taux de 
roulement du personnel exerce une influence négative plutôt faible. Ce sont les 
primes pour les heures supplémentaires qui influent le plus fortement, ce qui con-
firme l'opinion selon laquelle les avantages sociaux seraient une tactique des em-
ployeurs pour réduire le coût de la main-d'oeuvre dans la production. Mais ceci 
pourrait confirmer une autre hypothèse voulant qu'une augmentation de la part 
des compléments sociaux dans le coût total de la rétribution du travail ait forcé 
les employeurs à recourir au surtemps au lieu d'assumer les frais découlant d'un 
accroissement de personnel. 
